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masked_man_fallacy
The masked man fallacy occurs when Leibniz's law of identity substitution is incorrectly applied in intensional (belief/knowledge) contexts. While identical objects share all properties in extensional contexts, substitution fails when the context involves someone's beliefs, knowledge, or attitudes, because a person can know something under one description but not another. This is a subtle formal error rooted in the philosophy of language and reference.
"I know who my neighbor is. I don't know who robbed the bank. Therefore, my neighbor is not the person who robbed the bank."
Maria has known her accountant for years. She has no idea who has been embezzling funds from the company. Therefore, her accountant couldn't be the embezzler.
Jake knows exactly who his childhood friend is. He doesn't know who wrote the anonymous threatening letter. So his childhood friend clearly didn't write it.
Know(a, x) ∧ ¬Know(a, y) ⇒ x ≠ y (in intensional context)
Binary (yes/no) questions an LLM must answer to identify this aspect:
Does the argument involve identity claims about individuals or objects?
Type: binaryDoes it use a knowledge-based or belief-based (intensional) context?
Type: binaryDoes it apply Leibniz's law of identity substitution in an intensional context where it is invalid?
Type: binaryThe masked man fallacy occurs when Leibniz's law of identity substitution is incorrectly applied in intensional (belief/knowledge) contexts. While identical objects share all properties in extensional contexts, substitution fails when the context involves someone's beliefs, knowledge, or attitudes, because a person can know something under one description but not another. This is a subtle formal error rooted in the philosophy of language and reference.
People intuitively assume that if they know a person, they know everything about that person, confusing knowledge of identity under one description with knowledge under all descriptions.
Distinguish between knowing an entity under one description and knowing it under all possible descriptions. Someone can be your neighbor and a bank robber simultaneously without you knowing both facts.
Appears in legal reasoning where witnesses claim certainty about identity, and in philosophical debates about consciousness, where knowledge of brain states does not automatically confer knowledge of mental states.
Using a key term ambiguously – one meaning in premise, another in conclusion.
The intensional fallacy occurs when co-referential terms (terms that refer to the same entity) are substituted within intensional (belief, knowledge, desire) contexts as though they were interchangeable. While 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' both refer to Venus, someone can believe something about the morning star without believing it about the evening star, because the cognitive content (intension) of the two descriptions differs. This is a formal error rooted in the distinction between extensional and intensional logic.
Use these tools to detect, analyze, or train this aspect.